Executive Summary
This paper describes the concept of social network mapping and demonstrates how it can be used by squadron commanders and leaders at all levels to provide subtle insights into their organizations as well as their personnel, which can then be used to make more informed leadership and management decisions. Among other applications, the information provided by network mapping can be used to facilitate the identification of mentors, leaders, and "powerhoarders"; to examine workload and workflow; to reengineer workspace; and, perhaps most importantly, to improve the communication flow intra-and inter-unit.
Total quality management, a managerial approach adopted by the Air Force from the business world over a decade ago, is briefly examined to identify the benefits of such an effort as well as the lessons learned. The argument is made that there is much value in seeking out new approaches in a constantly changing world, with certain cautionary notes.
Mapping social (or informal) networks is a leading edge tool that can greatly assist commanders and other leaders in getting a good sight picture of the myriad communication lines in their organizations. Further, this mapping can be done with a minimum of time investment from individual workers, since the data is crunched by computers using scientifically based algorithms. Finally, the recommended use for this tool is on a commander-initiated basis, with information protected much as it is with the annual USAF Chief of Staff survey.
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The Challenge for Today's Commander
Every new commander dreams of inheriting an organization with tiered and capable leadership working together like a well-oiled machine in support of mission objectives. The more likely scenario, however, is that the reality doesn't quite match the vision. While it is probable that the assigned mission is being accomplished and people are working hard and overcoming various obstacles to make it happen, the going is probably rough and morale not what it could be. With a continued deficit of mid-level experience, supervisors and trainers are stretched to the breaking point, and apprentice-level airmen are expected to do much of their learning on their own. Meanwhile, the operations tempo is up (and had been well before September 11 th ) and parts availability and equipment are often less than adequate. It's no wonder that organizations aren't just gliding along and that the morale of many is in the dregs.
When separating airmen are queried as to why they are choosing to leave the force instead of making it a career, the fourth-cited reason is "leadership at the unit level." 1 While it is understandable that airmen are and have been leaving for civilian job opportunities and higher paychecks, it is extremely discouraging that leadership-or, more specifically, the lack thereofis also a strong reason to leave instead of a compelling reason to stay. What are we doing wrong? What can we do better? How is a commander to guide his unit through the current maelstrom of challenges and lead his unit to organizational effectiveness nirvana complete with good morale and people who want to be there?
Besides being credible leaders in their own rights, one obvious answer is that commanders need to assemble all available resources in their pursuit of organizational excellence. They must identify and co-opt the leaders at all levels within their units as well as those with the potential to lead, to build the unit cohesion needed to effectively meet extremely 1 demanding mission requirements. However, this is easier said than done, especially in larger units. While certain squadron members are bound to stand out by virtue of their obvious credibility, leadership skills, and position, there are also informal leaders who quietly operate behind the scenes, with talents that are not being fully leveraged. Supervisors only two or three levels up the chain may be quite unaware of the influence these "hidden" leaders project on their peers and subordinates. Then there are others with as yet untapped-perhaps even unidentified-potential, but who could exercise positive influence on a measurable segment of the workforce if placed in the right positions. On the dark side, there are those who by virtue of their positions and rank should be and appear to their seniors to be leaders, yet in reality fall far short and are actually simply neutral space-holders or even disruptive to the unit, lacking credibility with their subordinates. And as much as commanders vow to get out and about and gain first-hand knowledge of the individual capabilities of each of their troops, it's a rare commander who meets his own expectations in this regard. Therefore, even if we accept the premise that the commander needs to put in place a multi-tiered team of leaders, we're still left with the problem of how he's going to identify the right folks. Further, if he does manage to identify the folks he needs, he must figure out how to enact significant personnel movesbecause chances are, they are going to be some-without further disruption to the morale and effectiveness of his unit, all while being the new guy on the block. He doesn't have a lot of time, either, since most command tours only last two years. Of course, no one ever said it would be easy....
Tools for the Leadership Toolbox
There is no doubt that the Air Force as an institution recognizes the critical relationship of good leadership to effective mission accomplishment. Not only are significant resources devoted to the formal study of leaders and leadership methods in all levels of professional military education for both officers and enlisted personnel. Additionally, the hunt is continuously on for new tools to add to the leader's toolbox, by watching for leadership and management developments in business and academia with the goal of identifying and tailoring relevant methodology to address our own leadership challenges-a "technology transfer" of sorts. These applications are not undertaken lightly or on a whim, since we cannot afford to gamble with our combat edge. Further, the timely and effective deployment of any new leadership and/or management methodology across the force requires resources beyond those already programmed for formalized education, so it's no small commitment to decide to include new approaches in our standardized tool kits.
The importance for caution notwithstanding, over the years we have indeed appropriated various business models and methods to improve our own organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The most recent example of this cross-pollination was total quality management, or TQM, based on groundbreaking work by Dr W. Edwards Deming, a trained mathematician/physicist ultimately turned sociologist. Dr Deming developed an empirically based methodology to transform industrial organizations by improving their production processes. In addition to promoting the application of statistical process control at critical points along the way as opposed to inspections at the end of the production line, Dr Deming's "14
Points" outlined desirable manager/worker behaviors to engage all employees and make each one actively responsible for optimizing product quality. When the application of his methodology put Japanese industry back on its feet following World War II-and far ahead of the competition-US businesses studied and applied Deming's methods as they struggled to catch up with the Japanese. The US Navy then followed the lead of industry and applied Valuable lessons were learned from the "technology transfer" of TQM from the business world to the Air Force, but were the gains were worth the pain? Given the difficulties and resources required to introduce any substantially different approach, why can't we simply stick with our traditional leadership and management methods?
In a stationary world, we probably could keep doing things "the way we've always done them" and continue to obtain basic mission success. The fatal flaw in this concept, however, is obvious: the world is not stationary. When Frederick Taylor studied assembly lines and efficiencies thereof, it was his stated view that workers should be trained to accomplish tasks in one very specific and directed way to optimize the effectiveness of the line. In his own words, "Under our system a worker is told just what he is to do and how he is to do it. Any improvement he makes upon the orders given him is fatal to his success." 3 Initially, and for decades afterward, the concept of treating assembly line workers like automatons really worked pretty well-at least from the management's view, if not that of the workers. But as workers became more educated and "got out more," they became more and more dissatisfied with their one-dimensional treatment. Hence, the philosophy of Dr Deming-and others sharing the same school of thought that the worker should be respected and his inputs should be an integral part of the process-reaped almost immediate rewards when put to the test.
Before the introduction of TQM, the military workforce had undergone changes with which our leadership methodology had not kept pace. Education and experience levels of our enlisted force had soared, and we were certainly not consistently leveraging their expertise in solving problems. Further, the specialization and segregation of various career fields (e.g., flying 5 vice fixing aircraft) had resulted in some fairly serious rifts negatively impacting mission effectiveness. While as already mentioned there were some serious mistakes made in the actual deployment of TQM methods into the field, ultimately the concepts that lived beyond the "program" are utilized every day across the force to improve our overall mission effectiveness.
In the past decade, the speed of change has increased almost exponentially, even in the military. We are well past the stage of introducing computers to help handle the paperwork load with more efficiency than the now obsolete typewriter ever could, and the phenomenon of e-mail has enabled us to reach an unprecedented level of "real-time" communication. Simultaneously the boon and bane of commanders, e-mail enables them to be deluged with more written messages each day than could have ever been imagined in the past. It also enables them to reach out and touch every member of the squadron, albeit in a less personal manner than face-to-face.
E-mail does not, however, help them in their quest to get out and about more, the old (and still highly touted and respected) "management by walking around" concept. In fact, e-mail can be another rope cinching a commander to his desk, if it's not handled with care and even cunning.
By the nature of its very convenience, e-mail can actually encourage a commander not to leave his office at all, while still maintaining the semblance of connectivity with the rest of the squadron. In any case, e-mail is not going to help commanders in their search for internal leaders. Fortunately, there are other tools, both new and old, that can be of great assistance to our beleaguered grand poo-bahs.
Sociology to the Rescue
Sociologists, or social scientists, have spent more than a century and a half studying human interactions in a plethora of settings from families to tribes to, more recently, business The idea that social ties could be visually displayed in a "network" was developed in the 1930s. Jacob Moreno invented the sociogram, which used points to represent people and lines to represent relationships between them. He then used the mapping of such relationships to identify apparent leaders as well as those out of the mix entirely, which he called "isolates". He also used his sociograms to determine indirect lines of connection, as in A knows B who knows C, so A and C are indirectly connected. 4 Meanwhile, the observation that informal social ties within an organization were of notable importance was made following the famous Hawthorne plant experiment in which basic environmental factors such as lighting, heat, and rest period were varied to see how the changes affected worker productivity. As any basic management student knows, the surprising conclusion was that productivity went up regardless of the specific change made-whether the heat was raised or lowered, and so forth. The researchers concluded that it was the perception of management interest that caused productivity to increase-with the added attention, workers felt more valued, and therefore worked harder. After the conclusion of the Hawthorne experiment, the researchers continued to observe the workers and their work patterns, ultimately focusing on the relationships of the workers with each other. They discovered an "informal organization" which seemed to exert significant influence on the workers' productivity apart from any managerial influence or company policy. Later, in the 60s and 70s, a mathematical dimension of social network analysis was developed by a group at Harvard led by Harrison White. This translation of specific social phenomena to numerical quantities enabled this "worker influence"
phenomena to be measured and modeled. 5 Mark Granovetter, one of White's students, took the concept of social networks a step further when he researched how people got jobs. Ultimately, he determined that the far most effective way of getting jobs was through opportunities discovered by conversing with acquaintances as opposed to family members or close friends.
From this unexpected discovery, he developed and documented a theory about how information diffuses through social networks in his seminal book on social network analysis, Getting a Job.
6
Since its inception in the 1930s, the study of human behavior through the means of social network analysis has been "guided by formal theory organized in mathematical terms and grounded in the systematic analysis of empirical data." 7 Therefore, the field was artificially limited until the advances of the last few decades in graph theory and other related applied mathematics and the creation and availability of powerful computers. With those critical tools in hand, though, both the study and application of social network analysis have taken off.
Prestigious management schools now offer post-graduate degrees specifically focused on social network analysis, and there are numerous trade journals and professional organizations focusing on recent developments and applications spanning fields from contagious disease research (e.g., AIDs) to organizational behavior to social support. Of most interest to us, of course, is the development of cutting-edge tools now available to help commanders as well as directors of large staffs in their quests for organizational excellence.
8
The existence and relative importance of informal leaders to any group or organization is certainly not a new concept-if somehow we had missed noting that phenomenon while growing up, we certainly encountered it in our first management or professional military education (PME)
class. The field of social network analysis has proven that there is a predictable pattern to these informal connections, however, and that there are more roles to be played than strictly that of "leader". David Krakhardt, a leader in social network analysis, illustrated this pattern as a kite: and the worker-level buy-in would also be maximized.
The kite diagram represents a network that is just large enough to demonstrate each of the three types of critical nodes-the hub, gatekeeper, and pulse-taker (HGP). In a typical organization, there will be numerous examples of each of these types of nodes-generally, the larger the organization, the greater the number of the HGP nodes. Of course, some organizations are better interconnected than others, and that will also be readily visible by "maps" of the social networks-hereafter referred to as the "informal networks." An organization of reasonable size with very few centralizing nodes is at risk if one of those critical nodes should fail-if the incumbent changes jobs, becomes ill, and so forth. Therefore, as a general rule, it is better to have more HGP nodes and less centralization in the social network, first for the stability of the organization, but also because the risk of bottlenecking or worse is much greater if there are only a few key nodes.
Hierarchies, Anyone?
So where are hierarchies in all this networking stuff? Isn't a hierarchy a type of network with its own sort of nodes? A hierarchy is in fact a type of network structure, with nodes designed right in at every level. The difficulty with depending strictly on hierarchies is that they don't work exactly as advertised. That is not to say that they don't work. But there is no question that a strict application of the rules of hierarchy will ensure slowness, if not the pace of glacial drift, as well as certain inefficiencies. Therefore, different lines of communication and dependence are bound to develop which are separate and different from the hierarchical lines.
For example, let's look at the following hierarchy in an Air Force aircraft maintenance squadron.
Speciali Flight Su
Figure 2
For Flight B to resolve an issue with Flight E, the accepted route to resolve it within the rules of the formal hierarchical structure is for Flight B to take it up through the specialist chief who will take it over to the flightline chief. In turn, the flightline chief will obtain more information from Flight E, and then get back with the specialist chief, who will pass the information to Flight B. Obviously, the resolution of a single issue could take several iterations of up, down, and back again-not exactly an efficient or effective way of doing things. Hence, unless the chiefs insist that all issues go through them, informal networks are bound to spring up and cut across the hierarchical structure because that's the most efficient way to get things done.
This is quite natural and should be encouraged, since it improves organizational effectiveness in two ways: Flight B and Flight E should be able to resolve their issue more efficiently, and meanwhile the specialist and flightline chiefs can be working other issues. Of course, the presence of the hierarchy still provides a route to solve the issue should the two flights not be able to agree to a solution. On the other hand, if the hierarchy is ineffective in solving problems 13 when they are raised "up the chain" or if the members in the formal hierarchy are viewed as adding no value to the process, the informal networks will ultimately overwhelm the hierarchy or at least parts thereof.
The vast majority of organizations have both hierarchies and networks. While the hierarchical structure is obvious to anyone who can read an organizational chart, many informal networks operate below the surface and are often invisible to the hierarchy as well as to actual members in the networks. Hierarchies and networks have different attributes and therefore different advantages and disadvantages. For example, hierarchies are based on assigned authority and tend to be heterogeneous (not everyone looks or sounds the same), rigid, and slow to react. Networks are based on trust and tend to be homogeneous, flexible, and rapid to react. 10 Just like hierarchies, however, even networks can become ossified if they're not stirred up a little-witness the "old boy" networks that, while not part of a formal hierarchy, can be exclusionary and inflexible.
Networks can ultimately overcome hierarchies by putting them on disregard, but hierarchies can also squash networks by moving the people occupying critical nodal positions (either purposefully or accidently). Neither situation is desirable, however, because the complementary strengths of both the hierarchical structure and informal networks can be leveraged to improve the effectiveness of an organization.
Mapping Informal Networks
With the mathematical algorithms and high-powered computers available today, mapping various types of informal networks is not as difficult as it might sound. Data is collected from sets of only 6-10 tailored questions answered by each member of the organization being mapped. 
Can This Really Be a Tool for the Military?
As a previous commander of a 700-person squadron, I can see great utility in occasionally mapping the sub-surface networks in a military organization. Even someone in charge of a 200-person unit can't possibly be aware of all the inner-workings of his organization, and with around-the-clock shifts, the task is that much more difficult. It's relatively easy to know the first several layers of assigned leadership, but beyond that it rapidly gets harder.
Deployments are always helpful in getting to observe first-hand a particular set of airmen from the most junior on up, but even that doesn't provide enough exposure either depth-wise or across the organization of all assigned personnel.
Network mapping isn't going to remove the challenge or the need to continually strive to personally know one's troops. However, it can provide an instant and reasonably reliable picture of the various influences of different unit members in addition to drawing a general picture of the information flow within and external to the organization itself. Alternatively, a commander could query his underlings for names of the most influential members under their supervision and on down the chain; besides being a pain in the neck to obtain, though, the results would by definition be skewed by the perceptions of the reporting supervisors.
Practical Uses of Network Mapping
Unlike some other management tools and methodologies, network mapping is relatively simple to accomplish and the results can be put to immediate use. For starters, network mapping provides the capability to accomplish the following actions:
Identify individuals filling key communications node positions: By identifying the hubs, gatekeepers, and pulse-takers, one can dramatically improve the clarity of one's communications to the squadron at large. Information is traditionally passed from the commander or director to the next level down, and so forth, but invariably there are folks at the middle or at the bottom who either don't get the message, or else get a jumbled message. While I wouldn't recommend ceasing the traditional method of information flow-since we are, after all, accustomed to working within a hierarchical framework, and with good reason-use of the hubs and gatekeepers as a second layer of information passing, albeit informal, would provide a second layer of opportunity to deploy an accurate message to the lower levels. For particularly important messages, this extra effort could be well worth it. Follow-up to clarify the accuracy and coverage of the deployed message, whether delivered by hubs and gatekeepers or by through traditional supervisory channels, could be done by querying the pulse-takers.
Identify principal mentors:
By framing survey questions that ask who individuals turn to for career and personal advice, one can get a solid idea of how much mentoring is occurring in the unit and identify who is doing the mentoring. If the named supervisors have been in the squadron for a while, the relative quality of their mentoring can be surmised by examining the progress and retention of their mentees. It would also be of interest to observe which supervisory senior NCOs and field graders are named infrequently or not at all. If some are named with regularity while others are not, it would be reasonable to consider the reasons whylack of opportunity, lack of engagement, lack of credibility, personal issues of their own, etc.
Finally, who is mentoring whom would be of interest in terms of diversity. Is mentoring cutting across gender, race, and religion, or is it simply like mentoring like? If the latter is seen to be true, then opportunities are probably being lost as well as potentially inequitable. 
Cautions
If misused as a stand-alone information provider or taken as gospel, network mapping tools could lead to disastrous results. For example, deciding to recognize or reward personnel based solely on their number of hub connections could result in the recognition of an individual who is great on the grapevine but maybe not too productive beyond information sharing.
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Likewise, deciding to discipline or not recommend for promotion a supervisor who didn't show the expected subordinate links would not only obviate an opportunity to help that supervisor improve his performance; the resultant frustration, mortification, resentment and worse could further compound the relatively basic problem of an ineffective supervisor.
Network mapping should, however, provide previously hidden data points a leader could use as a jumping off point to further evaluate his organization and the interaction of the members therein. This information should be protected for sole use by the commander, similarly to the protection of data emanating from the annual USAF Chief of Staff survey.
Compatibility/Connection with Other Survey Tools
Gathering data through surveys is not a new concept to the Air Force. The most prominent example is the annual chief of staff survey, which is distributed on the world wide web and then tallied at varying levels, from across the Air Force as a single entity, through wings and groups and all the way down to individual squadron level. While this particular survey cannot by its very nature provide all the answers as to why people hold specific opinions, it does provide a picture of the current morale climate which in turn can serve as a launching point for more specific discussions leading to tailored, by-location/unit improvements. The Air Force also utilizes a squadron-level environmental assessment survey on a bi-annual (or commanderrequested) basis to collect viewpoints from squadron members on equity of treatment as well as the perceived effectiveness of the unit's leadership. Other surveys are also occasionally issued through other channels, such as surveys specific to health care and morale, recreation, and welfare opportunities. These often target a randomly selected population and arrive through the 21 US mail system, with the objective of gathering information that will lead to the improvement of services provided to Air Force members.
Tools that Don't Require Surveys or Algorithms
Even if one doesn't want to use the tool of mapping the informal networks in one's organization, simply the recognition that such networks exist and can be positively leveraged is an insight a commander can use to the organization's advantage. One can also work to modify a network's propensity to be homogeneous vice heterogeneous by providing somewhat structured opportunities for network growth-across an organization as well as across racial, gender, and religious lines. The concepts that follow are not new, and intuitively their worth has been felt perhaps since the military has been in existence. Now, however, we have science backing us up with empirical data to prove their value....
Beer calls (or Perrier calls, if concerns about alcohol consumption override), burger burns, and break rooms can all be used to build networks within an organization. By providing opportunities for those who work together to play together-whether within a flight, squadron, or wing-informal networks can be built and strengthened which can then be used as resources for expertise, information, and support. While networks will naturally spring up to some degree on their own, the value of providing these opportunities is that they foster connections beyond the typically homogeneously-inclined groupings. Interestingly, such networking opportunities can also strengthen the relative influence of the formal hierarchy, if the leadership makes time to participate in such gatherings on a regular basis. Paperwork gets delayed, it is true, but loyalty is increased both ways as the leader gets to know his troops better, and those same troops understand they have top-cover concern and interest.
As an adjunct, unit ownership of a "dog machine" 11 or something like it, can provide resources with which to support said gatherings. While I'm not advocating that we become like parts of the Chinese Army, more concerned with farming than defending, a reasonable amount of discretionary funds is essential to support events used to bring unit members together. If such funds can be acquired by selling soft ice cream to pilots, then morale and teamwork are heightened all the more (a win-win for both the seller and the purchaser!).
Conclusion
Network mapping is a new tool that can be used to great advantage by commanders and leaders at all levels to provide subtle insights into their organizations as well as their personnel, which can then be used to make more informed leadership and management decisions. If this tool is to be used, however, it should be a complete effort with proper training, software, and follow-up. Further, this should be an optional tool, not a mandate, and the information obtained therefrom should be safeguarded.
Even without the formal application of network mapping, commanders can leverage their knowledge of the existence of informal networks by providing opportunities to build nonhomogeneous networks as well as increase the personal credibility of the hierarchical leadership.
This, in turn, will improve the communication flow, work flow, mentoring opportunities, morale, and ultimately mission effectiveness of their units. We'll know we've achieved a level of success when airmen being surveyed cite unit leadership as a reason for staying, vice departing, the Service.
